Noting that William Blake's poem The Tyger has been interpreted to mean or represent many different things, Fish argues that there is nothing in the text or context that prevents us from imagining any number of equally valid interpretations. In other words, there can be no single correct interpretation because one's interpretation of the facts-indeed, the facts themselves-are products of one's interpretive stance. Thus, Fish (1980) concludes that "the text is always a function of interpretation" (p. 341).
The turn toward indeterminacy in literary criticism reflected the emergence of a broader intellectual movement known as postmodernism. Elaborating on Daniel Bell's (1973) distinction between industrial and postindustrial societies, Jean-François Lyotard ([1979] 1984, 3) and other social theorists assert a related transformation at the analytical level of culture-especially knowledge. Lyotard (p. 5) observes that in any number of equally valid ways because there is no one correct interpretation. Furthermore, while interpretations are always controversial and contested, there can be no recourse to "the facts" (i.e., data) because what one considers the facts is a function of one's interpretive stance. On what basis, then, can one claim any authority to represent others ethnographically?
There has been a spectrum of responses to these developments. Some ethnographers welcome the opportunity for experimentation, but others are uncertain about how to practice their trade, and still others are hostile to what they view as the abandonment of scientific method. In light of this controversy, Marcus and Fischer (1986) have declared "a crisis in representation" (p. 7)-an assessment that was echoed by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1994, 9) . However, Paul Rabinow (1986) has demurred from this perspective: "the insight that anthropologists write employing literary conventions, although interesting, is not inherently crisis-provoking" (p. 243). Van Maanen (1995) is equally skeptical, contending that "the idea of something like an ethnographic revolution . . . is itself a rather improbable and odd notion" (p. 17). There is, of course, some irony in the fact that during this uncertain era, the assertion of a crisis in representation is just another contested claim. In any event, the gravity of this assertion, together with its associated controversy, make it appropriate for us to take up some of the questions that confront contemporary practitioners of ethnography.
Is there a crisis in representation? What are the implications of this claim for ethnographic research? Must we change what we have been doing, or can we proceed, albeit more carefully and less naively? What, if anything, replaces traditional, realist ethnography, and what criteria do we use to distinguish good work from bad? What is the relationship between observation and interpretation in ethnographic inquiry? What basis is there, if any, for the researcher's authority to represent others ethnographically? What is the purpose of ethnography? What are the implications of uncertainty as a collective presentation of ethnographic self to our academic and general audiences? The future of ethnography will be shaped by our answers to these questions. Clifford, James. 1986 (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , and he has served on the editorial board of Social Psychology Quarterly, The Sociological Quarterly, and Time and Society. He is the author of A Watched Pot: How We Experience Time (1999, NYU Press) and coeditor of Investigating Subjectivity: Research on Lived Experience (1992, Sage) . His current research concerns the relationship between agency and temporal experience.
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CONFRONTING ETHNOGRAPHY'S CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION
NORMAN K. DENZIN
Confronting ethnography's crisis of representation is no longer an option. The critical self-reflexivity that underlies this crisis is not "a privileged understanding taken up at one's leisure" (Lee and Ackerman 1994, 351) . We have no choice but to seriously examine how we conduct our business in the everyday world.
Ironically, what appears on the surface to be one crisis is in fact three: the intertwined crises of representation, legitimation, and praxis.
Embedded, as Flaherty notes, in the discourses of poststruturalism and postmodernism, these three crises are coded in multiple ways, variously associated with the narrative, critical, interpretive, postcolonial, feminist, and critical race turns in the human disciplines. The representational crisis asserts that if we only know a thing through its representations, then ethnographers no longer directly capture lived experience. Experience is created in the social text. The legitimization crisis questions how we bring authority to our texts. It involves a serious rethinking of such terms as validity, reliability, and generalizability. This crisis, in turn, shapes the third, which asks, "How is it possible to effect change in the world, if society is only and always a text?"
These three crises create a new set of understandings concerning the interpretive project. Theory, writing, and ethnography are inseparable practices. Our interpretive practices have a material effect on the world; there is a materiality to the text. Together they create the conditions that make the world visible. We change the world by changing the way we make it visible.
Ethnography's threefold crisis is in fact part of a larger set of understandings, those connected to the recent discourses in qualitative inquiry in the human disciplines. Conceived thusly, qualitative inquiry is a name for a "reformist movement that began in the early 1970s in the academy" (Schwandt 2000, 189) . Qualitative inquiry, as a field, now has its own journals, scientific associations, conferences, and faculty positions (Denzin and Lincoln 2000a, x) . 1 This movement, in its postcolonial and postmodern forms, has made significant inroads into many social science disciplines, including English and comparative literature; sociology; anthropology; psychology; history; education; communications; consumer research; social work; community health; cultural, environmental, and disability studies; and qualitative medical research.
The transformations that gained momentum in the 1990s continue into the first decade of the new century. The appeal of a critical, interpretive social science increases (Chambon and Irving 1999, xvi) . Some term this the seventh moment of inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2000b, 2, 12) .
2 This is a period of explosion and ferment. It is defined by breaks from the past, a focus on previously silenced voices, a turn to performance texts, and an abiding concern with moral discourse, with conversations about democracy, politics, race, gender, class, nation, freedom, and community (Lincoln and Denzin 2000, 1048) .
In the seventh moment, as Flaherty observes, there is a pressing demand to show how the practices of critical, interpretive qualitative research can help change the world in positive ways. This is the traditional calling of a critical social science. It is necessary to examine new ways of making the practices of critical qualitative inquiry central to the workings of a free democratic society. This is my agenda in this short essay, to show how the discourses of qualitative inquiry can be put to critical advantage by those who share this perspective.
My discussion unfolds in two parts. I first outline a set of interpretive criteria that can be used in the seventh moment when appeals to objective epistemologies are questioned. I then address the implications of these criteria for critical social science practice.
INTERPRETIVE CRITERIA IN THE SEVENTH MOMENT
In the social sciences today there is no longer a God's-eye view that guarantees absolute methodological certainty (Smith and Deemer 2000, 877) . All inquiry reflects the standpoint of the inquirer. All observation is theory laden. There is no possibility of theory-or value-free knowledge. The days of naive realism and naive positivism are over. In their place stand critical and historical realism and various versions of relativism. The criteria for evaluating research are now relative. This is the nonfoundational position.
3
An antifoundational, critical social science seeks its external grounding not in science, in any of its revisionist, postpositivist forms, but rather in a commitment to a post-Marxism and communitarian feminism with hope but no guarantees. It seeks to understand how power and ideology operate through and across systems of discourse, cultural commodities, and cultural texts. It asks how words, texts, and their meanings play a pivotal part in the culture's "decisive performances of race, class [and] gender" (Downing 1987, 80) .
In the seventh moment, the criteria for evaluating critical qualitative work are moral and ethical. Those who have power determine what is aesthetically pleasing and ethically acceptable. Thus this position erases any distinction between epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics. In a feminist, communitarian sense, this aesthetic contends that ways of knowing (epistemology) are moral and ethical (Christians 2000) . This 484 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 feminist, ethical position challenges the utilitarian basis of many codes of ethics, those codes administered by Institutional Review Boards, and ethical review committees.
All aesthetics and standards of judgment are based on particular moral standpoints. Shedding the biases of Enlightenment rationality, a feminist, dialogical ethical framework privileges the dialogical, I-thou relationship. Truth now "is understood as authenticity in a social context" (Christians 1997, 16) . Maintaining human dignity in the face of adversity is a primary ethical goal. In these ways, the Institutional Review Board approach to ethics is transformed into a humanistic discourse on care, solidarity, and universal human rights. This is a dialogical epistemology and aesthetic. It involves a give and take and ongoing moral dialogue between persons. It enacts an ethic of personal and community responsibility (Collins 1991, 214) . Politically, this aesthetic embodies an ethic of empowerment. This aesthetic enables social criticism and engenders resistance. It helps persons imagine how things could be different. It imagines new forms of human transformation and emancipation. It enacts these transformations through dialogue. If necessary, it sanctions nonviolent forms of civil disobedience, understanding that how this ethic works in any specific situation cannot be given in advance (Christians 2000, 148) .
Properly conceptualized ethnographic research becomes a civic, participatory, collaborative project, a project that joins the researcher with the researched in an ongoing moral dialogue. This is a form of participatory action research. It has roots in liberation theology, neoMarxist approaches to community development, and human rights activism in Asia and elsewhere (Kemmis and McTaggart 2000, 568) .
Such work is characterized by shared ownership of the research project, community-based analyses, and an emancipatory, dialectical, and transformative commitment to community action (Kemmis and McTaggart 2000, 568, 598) . This form of research "aims to help people recover, and release themselves, from the constraints embedded in the social media" (Kemmis and McTaggart 2000, 598) and in their daily lives. This means that the researcher learns to take on the identities of public advocate and cultural critic. Consistent with the principle of empowerment, this ethic asks that interpretive work provide the foundations for social criticism and social action. As a cultural critic, the researcher speaks from an informed moral and ethical position. He or she is anchored in a specific community of moral discourse.
MORAL CRITICISM AND TAKING SIDES
Taking sides is a complex process (Becker 1967; see also Hammersley 2000) , involving several steps. First, researchers must make their own value positions clear, including the so-called facts and ideological assumptions that are attached to these positions. Second, they should identify and analyze the values and claims to objective knowledge that organize positions that are contrary to their own. Third, they show how these appeals to ideology and so-called objective knowledge reflect a particular moral and historical standpoint. Fourth, they show how this standpoint disadvantages and disempowers members of specific groups. Fifth, they next make an appeal to a participatory, feminist, communitarian ethic and its dialogic conceptions of care, love, beauty, and empowerment. Sixth, they apply this ethic to the specifics of a concrete case, showing how it would and could produce social betterment. Advocates of the Black Arts Movement in the 1970s, for example, asked how much more beautiful a poem, melody, play, novel, or film made the life of a single black person (Gayle [1971 (Gayle [ ] 1997 (Gayle [ , 1876 .
Seventh, in a call to action, researchers engage in concrete steps that will change situations. They may teach children and adults how to bring new value to identities and experiences that are marginalized and stigmatized by the larger culture. They will demonstrate how particular commodities or cultural objects negatively affect the lives of specific people. They indicate how particular texts directly and indirectly misrepresent persons and reproduce prejudice and stereotypes.
In advancing this utopian project, the critical researcher seeks new standards and new tools of evaluation. For example, Karenga (1997 Karenga ( / 1972 , a theorist of the Black Arts Movement in the 1970s, argued that there were three criteria for black art. Such art, he said, must be functional, collective, and committed. Functionally, this art would support and "respond positively to the reality of a revolution" (p. 1973). It would not be art for art's sake; rather it would be art for our sake, art for "Sammy the shoeshine boy, T. C. the truck driver and K. P. the unwilling soldier" (p. 1974) . Karenga told blacks that we do not need pictures of oranges in a bowl, or trees standing innocently in the midst of a wasteland . . . or fat white women smiling lewdly. . . . If we must paint oranges or trees, let our guerrillas be eating those oranges for strength and using those trees for cover. (p. 1974) 486 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 According to Karenga (1997) , collectively, black art comes from people, and must be returned to the people, "in a form more beautiful and colorful than it was in real life. . . . Art is everyday life given more form and color " (p. 1974) . Such art is committed, it is democratic, and it celebrates diversity and personal and collective freedom. It is not elitist. These goals and the demand that works be functional, collective, and committed represent a manifesto for researchers. A single question guides the project: "how can I use my work to advance these utopian democratic goals?"
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Critical ethnographic research in the seventh moment will use the interpretive criteria outlined above. It will take sides. Through story telling, performance texts, rich local ethnographies, and ethnoscapes (McCall 2001, 50) , researchers can show members of the underclass how to find their own cultural homes within the shifting oppressive structures of global and local capitalism.
Activist researchers will show persons how to fashion their own grounded aesthetics within the spaces of the everyday world (Willis 1990) . This grounded aesthetic is at once political and personal. It speaks to the complex interplay between resistance and consumption, between desire and pleasure. This grounded aesthetic functions both as a vehicle and as a site of resistance. In the arena of consumption and race, for example, race scholars deconstruct negative racial images. They turn these negative images into positive representations. They invent new cultural images and slogans.
Critical researchers listen to the perspectives and voices of many different stakeholders. In any given situation they will advocate for the side of the underdog (Ryan et al. 1998 ). They will demonstrate, for example, how the media reproduce gender, racial, sexual orientation, and social class stereotypes and even contribute to consumer practices that are harmful to personal health and the environment. In so doing, they engage in social critique and moral dialogue, identifying the different gendered relations of cultural capital that operate in specific cultural contexts.
But more is involved. The researcher assesses specific programs and makes recommendations for change. Such a commitment makes the researcher accountable for the moral and personal consequences of any particular instance of advocacy.
IN CONCLUSION
There is a pressing need for a critical theory of society that combines historical, sociological, cultural, and political analysis (Harms and Kellner 1991, 43) . I believe that a more radical research agenda can advance this project. This theory and this project dream of a society where individuals "freely determine their needs and desires" (Harms and Kellner 1991, 65) . In the seventh moment this society comes into focus through the use of the kinds of interpretive practices outlined above.
With John Sherry (2000, 278) , I am convinced that critical interpretive research has a vital moral and political role to play in the new millennium. I too am concerned with how our patterns, practices, and philosophies of consumption estrange us from and threaten our place in the "natural" world. And with Sherry, I believe we need to craft new humanistic "interdisciplinary methods of inquiry and inscription" (p. 278).
A great deal is at stake. As participants in a larger system of governmentality and social control we need to develop new ways of evaluating critical qualitative work. The problem is clear: critical inquiry must be focused around a clear set of moral and political goals that are connected to a clearly defined set of interpretive practices. In this essay I have attempted to outline one version of these goals and practices. 2. Denzin and Lincoln (2000b, 2) define the seven moments of inquiry, all of which operate in the present, as the traditional (l900-l950), the modernist (l950-l970), blurred genres (l970-l986), the crisis of representation (l986-l990), postmodern or experimental (l990-1995), postexperimental (1995-2000) , and the future (2000-?).
3. There are three basic positions on the issue of evaluative criteria: foundational, quasi-foundational, and nonfoundational. Foundationalists apply the same positivistic 488 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 criteria to qualitative research as are employed in quantitative inquiry, contending that there is nothing special about qualitative research that demands a special set of evaluative criteria. Quasi-foundationalists contend that a set of criteria unique to qualitative research must be developed (see Smith and Deemer 2000) . Nonfoundationalists reject in advance all epistemological criteria. Becker, Howard S. 1967 
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CRISIS
The present center holds. The "center," in my view, is the nominal solution to the question of meaning worked out and elaborated by researchers such as Stouffer, Lazarsfeld, and others at Harvard and Columbia after World War II. This move included using large data sets 490 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 if possible, gathered using interviews and questionnaires, analyzed using statistics and inductive inference, interpreted in imaginative ad hoc ways, and justified using functionalistic theorizing. This modus operandi, once it migrated to National Opinion Research Center at Chicago and Berkeley's Center, established the hegemony of such sociology. It has dominated the elite journals since. The social sciences remain fundamentally and essentially dominated by this version of positivism and statistical reasoning. This operational and conceptual shift brought meaning in clandestinely, that is, hidden in plain sight. The basic claim of this positivism was and is that science is cumulative, objective, and generalizable insofar as it meets the opaque standards of such theorizing. Funded research and publications in major journals are mathematically grounded and their findings supported with reference to increasingly sophisticated formulae. Economics, the only field with Nobel Prize status, is a theoretically driven rational-mathematical enterprise.
The term "crisis" of representation implies some generalized dissatisfaction with modern social science, but it has meaning only in fields in which notation and theory are qualitative. Marginal subfields within social science, for example, symbolic interactionism, social psychology, ethnography, literature (especially literary criticism, an elaborate mirror job-a critique of critiques), and to a lesser degree, social history are being reshaped. On the whole, these fields never claimed universal truths and oscillate between displaying a detailed, context-based ensemble of low-level tenets about the human condition and ponderous generalities. Recently revised ways of thinking about positivism as well as changes in the social world include at very least a recognition of the limits of a science rooted entirely in notions of Western and Northern European philosophy, epistemology, and reasoning. These have renewed interest and intensity in these marginal fields.
Much discussion of this matter of a crisis is ahistorical, and thus my comment requires a brief history. The discontent and fragmentation within the social sciences resulted from the response of European intellectuals to the death of Marxism after World War II and challenges to French rationalism-varieties of existentialism, structuralism(s), and psychoanalysis. These ideas, loosely derived from surrealism and semiotics, played with the irrational and the unconscious, and contained residues of Heideggerian and Hegelian phenomenology. The overt point of crystallization and differentiation was the May 1968 explosion in Paris. The failure of French thought to accommodate the new guises of old irrationalities stimulated major debates in the Haute Ecole and the College de France.
Debates about the nature of knowledge, science, and society, often distorted by translation and lack of knowledge of the French cultural and political context, and seen through the eyes of American empiricism, toppled over into North America in the late seventies and eighties. The resultant discussion, moribund if not dead in France, concerned "structuralism," "the linguistic turn," "semiotics," and "postmodernism," all of which are products of the politicized intellectual scene in Paris in the seventies.
Thirty years later, absent an understanding of their derivation and roots, the skeletal remains of these carcasses have washed ashore somewhere in America and are seen as indicating an epistemological crisis. This is especially ironic in the community of scholars supporting this journal since their traditions and inclinations have always been pragmatic and their inspirational icon remains George Herbert Mead.
PHENOMENOLOGY
What is the role of phenomenology in this history and the putative "crisis"? The phenomenological movement is grounded in the work of Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Kojeve, the later Gurvitch, and was given unique impetus by Harold Garfinkel in this country. The phenomenology of writers who influenced American social science asserts that the self and existential questions are tertiary or nonexistent, no transcendent ego exists, and the geometry of life is representational, deeply and irrevocably representational. Subject and object become as one. It is a formalism quite radically opposed to pragmatism. Like pragmatism, it argues that only when discontinuities arise do intellectualizing, reflecting, pointing, and naming flourish. Excess, mystery, and surplus meanings float then. The routines of life, their "thereness," is never in question in the social world of the nonintellectual. The crises that arise from time to time to enliven the otherwise bleak world of the intellectual reside in the curious, highly elaborated, pseudolinguistic world of the "thinker." Since Wittgenstein, there has been little question that meaning comes from context, not alone from representation, or the material world. It is well to recall that ethnography is not just about "writing" (Van Maanen, 1996) 
COPING WITH THE CRISIS
There were and are challenges to the center. Throughout the seventies, efforts were made to rework the idea of meaning through the formalization of nonstatistical techniques: cognitive anthropology; conversational analysis (the management of conversational routines); content analysis based on computer software programs; and some modes of structuralism and semiotics derived from Levi-Strauss, Foucault, and Lacan. These minitrends, or fashions, failed to capture the high ground from what C. Wright Mills called "dust bowl empiricism." Statistical analysis based on large surveys, questionnaires, and interviews dominated, and in time journals were filled with articles based on survey research done in China, Hungary, and Russia, demonstrating the power of American survey research to tap emergent capitalism, and studies of structure using formal modeling techniques.
Phenomenology, as a question of the structure of meaning, is reflected in current debates about representation in at least two ways. It is also twinned with semiotics in my view.
First, semiotics and phenomenology are linked historically. Semiotics influenced structuralism and as structuralism and poststructuralism suffused social theory, knowledge of the influence of semiotics was lost (Dosse 1991a (Dosse , 1991b . When structuralism was combined with a "primitive phenomenology," as early statements by Culler and Barthes suggest, it was a tense and awkward marriage, which ended in fact in divorce. Phenomenology is central to semiotics in its revised, symbolizing as well as symbolic or representational form (Sebeok 1990; Eco 1979) . That is, once signifiers point, indicate, or arbitrarily symbolize something social, rather than merely being a logical connection as in Saussure, that is, become representational, and are linked to signifieds, the connection, the linkage, or the "interpretant" is cultural and issues from context in large part. These links in turn may be institutionalized REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 493 and unexamined. The ambiguities in meaning can arise from signifiers, and signifieds, as well as the syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic features of any coding system. Second, the divisions between earlier versions (Levi-Straussian) and later versions of structuralism can be calibrated precisely with respect to how much attention was given to active situated sense making. In many respects, in current versions of structural analysis, phenomenology is reduced to agency, habitus, and other structural glosses, and the self denied in writing as diverse as that of Baudrillard, Lyotard, Bourdieu, and Deleuze. These are modified and stylized versions of cultural Marxism in which exchange of meaning and symbols are treated analogically as if they were money. The irrational, the semiconscious, and the traditional pattern these exchanges in a mysterious and mystifying fashion, and they work through overtly richly elaborated symbols and institutions.
The referential version of semiotics has altered the intellectual landscape much more outside sociology than inside where it is ignored and misunderstood. Consider this-the argument of structuralism, taken from semiotics via Saussure, was that code determined meaning, not actor; that self had no place in such analysis; and that meaning arose from the structure of relations within the elements, not through interactive interpretations. Barthes argued for the notion that signifier and signified were connected via interpretation and that semiotics was indeed a subfield of language analysis, not the contrary, as argued by semioticians influenced by Saussure. When the pragmatisms of Pierce, Mead, and Morris via the writings of Sebeok and Eco reached American social science, it was too late to alter the conventional wisdom about the semiotics. The dominance of the Foucault version of structuralism drawing on his readings of historical facts and using the semiotic analogy had been established. Distinctions between semiotics, phenomenology, and symbolic interactionism, well discussed in the prescient work of Dean MacCannell, Charles Lemert, and Norman Denzin, vanished into the maw of postmodernism.
The divorce was tacit because one cannot easily combine formalism via structuralism, which denies the transcendence of the self or ego, and existential meaning, with a critique that rests on an interpretive, aesthetically grounded existentialism. This formulation now drives American discussions of the crisis, especially in cultural studies. The peculiar and eccentric merging of structuralism, a response to phenomenology and existentialism in France, emerged as an attack on all forms of structural functionalism and interpretive sociology in America and became most powerful as a dismissive, anarchistic antitheory. The idea that standpoint and deep unconscious forces shaped perception, feeling, and interpretation was honed to a fine edge in writings that critiqued the dominant patriarchy in social sciences by serious scholars such as Helen Cixous, Toril Moi, and Julia Kristeva in Europe and Judith Butler and others in North America.
THE URGE TO DIFFERENTIATE
The surge of crisis-like concerns can be marked within the interactionist community by the appearance of the Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) . It had large sales, spawned many controversial conference sessions, and went on to a multiple-volume, reorganized paper edition and a revised second edition. I believe it captures most exquisitely the transformation of phenomenology in American sociological social psychology.
The Handbook (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) was to celebrate diversity, voice, and standpoint rather more than to dwell on technique, reliability, or reproducibility of results or findings. Recognition of the humanity of the observer and his or her flaws, values, and perspectives, often those of nominal minorities, nonconventional groups, and diverse gender orientations, was urged. This was awkwardly combined with the assumption of the entanglement of observer and observed, a strong phenomenological theme. Master narratives, whether in ethnography, case studies, or literary criticism, were discredited (ironically, since the master narrative being advanced by the writer as a general debunking of some other hegemony remained viable). "Master" in this sense means only a general account for a process or state of affairs and can cover virtually any dominant accepted "story." In many ways, the appeal of new modes was sensate. Cumulative objective science was seen as a misleading and illusory belief that benefited those in power. The thrust of the key chapters on doing fieldwork was a profound and deeply felt rejection of the canons of positivistic fieldwork and ethnographic analysis. The primary point is that explicitly acknowledged phenomenological thinking was not a part of this epiphany, although occasional reference was made to deconstruction (via Derrida) or to Foucault on knowledge REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 495 and power. Semiotics was briefly covered in a chapter including other topics. In short, the chapters in the Handbook formed a part of a surge in interest in the nonrational, the discursive, the poetic, and in genre blurring, and urged a new phase in qualitative work. Much of this effort is now found in the two journals edited by Norman Denzin. In these exemplars, the varied and complex ways in which communication constitutes the person are played with and on.
Visualizing change in modern epistemology requires recognizing that meaning is always open ended. A symbolic analysis requires a theory of codes, encoding, and interpretation (Eco 1979), none of which exists in writings in the crisis mode. Central to modern life is the increased salience of the visual and experiences, cast in counterintuitive, ahistorical, and timeless forms, that resemble not so much grounded realities but quasi-dramatic encounters, DRAMA, and spectacles. Local knowledge is obviated in such scenes unlike the drama of production, performance, and affirmation within a known context. I have reference here to the shaping character of international broadcasts of wars, such as the Gulf war and the war in the former Yugoslavia; showings of the fall of the Berlin Wall, Tiananmen Square, and the Seattle demonstrations against the World Bank. I have reference also to the beating of Rodney King, the shooting of Diallo in New York City, and the Simpson trial, which have marked and underscored the fragmented meaning of basic ideas such as justice, equality, and the like.
I do not see the dialectic between rationalities and evocations as crisis, and I see no "solution." As Goffman (1983) , in his touching and evocative self-delivered funeral address, noted, there are many levels of interlaced orderings, but they are based in and validated against the primary reality-face-to-face copresence. When this is lacking, it is created and brought to that which is experienced. The endlessly iterative algorithm of interpretation exists only in theory, for time, energy, and patience, not to speak of memory, are limited. As wrote in Frame Analysis, people do not long tolerate meaninglessness. Ethnography must now address the sources of experience and context rather than focusing on the abstract questions of how to represent this. The presentation and representation of imagery is problematic, as is the fact that the social world is changing radically, and nineteenth-century social psychology no longer suffices.
Arguably, for that is what this essay is meant to be, it seems to me that the world, to an extent not imagined by my generation or indeed anyone older than thirty, is now mediated, and our experience is grounded in an increasingly reflected presence on screens of all kinds. We see ourselves represented and re-presented on many screens, passively and actively, alone and together, in private and public, and these images are reproduced in many formats, times and places, edited, stylized, transformed, and transfigured. This means that experience in face-to-face situations is in competition with mediated, especially commercialized, images and visualizations. Goffman entered the television age but did not embrace it. Yet, the snapshot interaction model of self-presentation among strangers, elegantly stated by Goffman in 1959, and based on existential premises, is becoming, perhaps, a powerful model for what is expected in mass society generally. Symbols are more condensed, multifaceted, and polyphonic because the traditions on which cliches and conventions are based are eroded. Buzzwords stimulating consumption and enhanced imagery are seized on as differentiating social groups. Importantly, politics and sources of interests, identities, obligations, and aesthetics mix, and copies and originals blur. Yet we cling to ideas of truth and morality based on judgments of individual character derived from the Greeks and based on sense data gathered from face-toface interactions.
What is the purpose of ethnography in this kind of world? As Goffman (1983) wrote, our task is to undermine the authoritative claims to truth of those in power. Ethnography is essentially the exploration, analysis of, and transformative understanding of context, what is brought to the situation. That is only in part a function of language and other modes of representation. Every representation is a presentation and thus requires a context if it is to be understood. In my view, the task is still "on the ground," in the study of everyday sense making, rather than in cinematic glimpses, postcards from exotic venues, or deeply self-ruminating poetry. crisis sketched in the introduction to these essays. The potential crisis I envision issues from the presumptive one inasmuch as scholars subscribe to the "crisis frame" and thus abandon various sociological principles and methodological guidelines that, if used as the basis for conducting ethnographic research, can mitigate or mute the practices that presumably engender misrepresentation. The result is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy that leads to a style or variant of ethnography that affirms the presumed crisis.
In this essay, I will first elaborate a number of observations that have prompted me to question the appropriateness of the crisis framing of ethnography, at least as conducted in sociology. I will then turn to the identification of a number of concepts and principles, drawn primarily from work associated with symbolic interactionism, that if incorporated into ethnographic research, can guard against the twin perils of misrepresentation: misinterpretation and the privileging of particular voices to the exclusion of others.
QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS AND PRACTICES UNDERLYING THE CRISIS FRAME
Underlying the crisis frame are a number of questionable practices regarding its constitution. The first concerns the presumption of a crisis without specification of the criteria by which a crisis is determined. Dictionary definitions reference turning points, decisive moments, unstable or crucial times or states of affairs, and critical junctures (American Heritage 1997; Webster's 1985) . The implication is that ethnography is at such a critical juncture or turning point. But how is that determined? By realization of the failure of few, if any, ethnographies to represent others without any slippage? If the criterion for evaluating ethnography is descriptive exactitude, such that textual representation is a mirror image of some social world as it actually exists and is experienced from moment to moment, then perhaps ethnography is ensnared in a crisis. But if we aim "at the more reasonable goal of securing a close approximation of the empirical world" (Snow and Morrill 1993, 10) , then the prospect of producing reasonably compelling ethnographies becomes more likely, and the specter of crisis diminishes.
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But short of such pragmatic and attainable standards, are we not left with the crisis pronouncement of a handful of scholars? Does REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 499 declaration of "a crisis" by some number of scholars necessarily make it so, especially when this sense of crisis is far from being universally shared among the practitioners of the enterprise in question? Ironically, such a presumption not only privileges a few voices over others, but it does so without reference to the criteria for granting special status to some claims or framings over others. There may be good reasons for such authorial privileging in this context, but they are rarely articulated.
Another questionable validating practice is the application of the crisis frame in one discipline on the basis of its presumed resonance in another discipline. Thus, we are apprized of its relevance to and currency in literary criticism and anthropology, but without sufficient consideration of the historical and methodological differences in the ethnographic enterprise across the relevant disciplines. While the assessment of a literary text may be essentially an interpretive exercise, constrained only by the reader's orienting perspective, it does not follow, ipso facto, that all interpretive enterprises are devoid of constraints other than perspectival orientation. As Becker (1970) noted some time ago in his penetrating but seemingly forgotten discussion of "fieldwork evidence," there are a number of constraints that make ethnographic field data more reliable or trustworthy than often assumed at first glance. One is a set of constraints that compel informants to act as they normally would in the absence of the ethnographer; the other is the constraining nature of the "rich data" generated by prolonged and persistent fieldwork. Because of such constraints, Becker argued that field observation is less likely than the more controlled methods of laboratory experiment and survey interview to allow the researcher to bias the results he gets in directions suggested by his own expectations, beliefs, or desires. Almost every field worker believes that proposition, ordinarily because he has often had to sacrifice pet ideas and hypotheses to the recalcitrant facts of the field. (pp. 42-43) While the nature and degree of constraints experienced by practitioners of different methodologies certainly are open to debate, the broader and more important consideration is that ethnographic fieldwork is subject to various methodological and contextual constraints that limit the prospect of unbridled, authorial interpretation. And just as disciplinary modes of inquiry may vary in terms of methodological and interpretive constraint, so they may vary in their historical development in ways that affect their degree of methodological self-consciousness 500 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 and interpretive sensitivity.
2 Such observations thus caution against the presumption of crisis in one mode of inquiry and interpretation on the basis of its said existence in another.
A further disconcerting practice associated with the crisis frame is the tendency to subsume the totality of the ethnographic enterprise under the rubric of either "reading" or "interpretation"-so much so that it is arguable that these two terms have come to function as synecdochical metaphors for ethnography. Illustrative is Van Maanen's (1988) statement, quoted in the introductory essay, that "fieldwork is an interpretive act, not an observational or descriptive one" (p. 93). One of the problems with converting one component of an activity into a synecdochical metaphor is that it focuses attention on only that aspect of the activity to the neglect of the other components that are also constitutive of the activity. Thus, it is reasonable to wonder why observation, whether participant or nonparticipant, and analysis are not as fundamental to the ethnographic enterprise as reading and/or interpretation. They are not only equally fundamental, from the vantage point of my various ethnographic experiences, but they provide the empirical ground-or "rich data" in Becker's (1970) words-from which compelling readings or interpretations are or should be derived. If so, then it is arguable that conversion of the practices of "reading" or "interpretation" into the synecdochical metaphors for ethnography suggests a misrepresentation rather than a reasonably faithful depiction of the character of the enterprise.
A troublesome consequence of this practice is the tendency to privilege voice and discourse over nonverbal behavior and observation. While this tendency is consonant with the so-called discursive turn in the social sciences, it can lead to an ethnographic enterprise that rests on the questionable assumption that what people say or tell us-as represented in their accounts, stories, narrations, or framings-provides a more credible and compelling portrait of the social world in question than do members' behaviors. But since it is well established that the relationship between what people say and do is often quite untidy, and even sometimes orthogonal (Deustcher, Pestello, and Pestello 1993) , there seems to be little good reason for privileging voice over action, or vice versa.
Finally, I find it puzzling that the representational crisis frame is usually proffered abstractly, except for reference to the representational sins or omissions of selected "classical" ethnographies, such as those conducted by Malinowski, Mead, Geertz, and Whyte. But are we to presume that no corrective advances have been made in the intervening years? And what is to be made of more recent sociological ethnographies, many of which have been recipients of various scholarly awards, such as those conducted by Adler and Adler (1998), Charmaz (1991) , Duneier (1999) , Fine (1996) , Horowitz (1996) , Morrill (1995) , and Snow and Anderson (1993) ? Are these, too, to be jettisoned overboard because of presumed representational errors?
It is because of such concerns and observations as the foregoing that I have been circumspect about embracing the crisis frame as it is applied to ethnography, and particularly ethnography as conducted in sociology. As well, it is my strong sense that the proclaimed representational crisis can be muted, and thus rendered relatively nonproblematic, when various fundamental sociological and methodological concepts and principles are incorporated as sensitizing guidelines when conducting ethnographic research.
SENSITIZING (AND THUS NEUTRALIZING) CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
The problem of representation, as I understand it, is predicated on two metaproblems: the problem of presuming and thus declaring or imposing a single interpretation of social reality when often there are both multiple and conflicting interpretations, and the related problem of voice and the tendency to privilege some voices and their proffered interpretations to the exclusion of others. Let us assume that there is substance to these metaproblems and that there is, indeed, a problem of representation. Does this mean that ethnography as practiced is doomed? I think not, at least not if we subscribe to the sociological thesis that interpretations and voices generally are embedded in social relations and contexts, and then proceed methodologically in a fashion that ensures access to numerous voices and facilitates elaboration of their socially embedded character. I draw on a range of sociological and interactionist concepts and principles that highlight and elaborate this thesis and its relevance to the issue of representation.
A number of these concepts and principles accent the socially embedded character of voice and the interpretations articulated. The broadest, and perhaps most basic, of these embedding concepts is 502 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 Mead's "universe of discourse." In his discussion of the significant symbol or gesture in Mind, Self, & Society (1962) , Mead notes that "a universe of discourse is always implied as the context in terms of which, or as the field within which, significant gestures or symbols do in fact have significance" (p. 89). It is, he says, "simply a system of common or social meanings" (pp. 89-90). Similarly, C. Wright Mills's (1940) concept of the "vocabulary of motives" and Scott and Lyman's (1968) analysis of "accounts" situate a category of talk, often referred to as "motive talk," within bounded social contexts, such as social circles, subcultures, institutions, and historical epochs. As Mills argued, "motives are of no value apart from the delimited societal situations for which they are appropriate vocabularies," as they "vary in content and character with historical epochs and social structure" (p. 913). Likewise, concept of primary frameworks is another embedding principle in that it enables its users "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (p. 21).
The implication of these different yet overlapping concepts for our purposes is that they suggest that the voices of our informants, and their verbalized accounts and interpretations, are typically anchored in and colored by a spectrum of understandings associated with a broader interpretive framework. Of course these anchoring interpretive frameworks, or "islands of meaning" as Zerubavel (1991, (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) has referred to them, seldom stand alone but are linked to and buttressed by institutional, organizational, group, or subcultural structures that function, in the language of Berger and Luckmann (1966) , as "plausibility structures" (pp. 154-55). If so, then the task of the ethnographer is not to treat voices as detached verbalizations or independent interpretations but to discern the linkage between "the said" and the universe of discourse, vocabulary of motive, or primary framework in which it is embedded and its anchoring organizational context. Such observations do not mean individual informants merely parrot institutional, organizational, group, or cultural and subcultural framings or vocabularies. Rather, individuals bring their own personal biographies and experiences to the process, but this contribution is filtered through and colored by the relevant social infrastructure's universe of discourse. The sociologically ethnographic task, then, is to ferret out this linkage by situating the voices of our informants both contextually and relationally. To do otherwise-that is, to abstract and dislodge voices from their relational and contextual moorings-is to misapprehend and thus misrepresent them sociologically and interactionally.
A persistent problem plaguing any attempt to draw out the connection among informant voices and embedding interpretive frameworks and organizational contexts or social worlds is that not all voices within most contexts or worlds are equally informative or credible. Rather, they are likely to be arrayed both horizontally and hierarchically throughout the social space in question, thus suggesting that some voices may be more useful than others for answering some questions or accessing particular points of view. Becker's (1970) concept of "hierarchy of credibility" (pp. 14, 126, passim) is particularly helpful here in that it directs attention to the hierarchical aggregation of "credible" information and thus opinion and interpretation. Becker invokes the concept to facilitate understanding of informant expertise and credibility within bureaucratic, organizational contexts, but the concept can be extended to any social circle, group, organization, or subculture in which information is variously distributed across members. The anthropologist Rosaldo (1989) makes a similar point when he emphasizes, throughout Culture and Truth, that ethnographers and informants are variously positioned structurally and thus observe and experience from and "with a particular angle of vision" (p. 19). Regarding informants, for example, Rosaldo writes, "so-called natives are also positioned subjects who have a distinctive mix of insight and blindness" (p. 19). Thus, for any particular informant, it is important to develop an understanding of the location of his or her particular angle of vision in relation to the enveloping context. In other words, to situate informant accounts, narrations, and so on, it is useful to know of what their voices are representative. This is true not only for any particular moment, of course, but also temporally, as accounts, framings, narrations, and vocabularies relevant to particular events and experiences are likely to be reconstructed or elaborated over time.
3
Such observations do not negate the prospect of generating compelling realist ethnographies. Rather, they sensitize us to the necessity of making multiple observations and/or securing numerous informants and thus accessing multiple voices rather than featuring and celebrating the single voice of an-other or of oneself, as in the case of so-called autoethnography. To do so, there are numerous methodological principles and guidelines in the ethnographer's "toolkit" that can be dusted off and used. One is that we think more carefully about the different Zelditch (1962) addressed the issue of informant variability, suggesting that informants may function as "surrogate census takers," as "representative respondents," and/or as "the observer's observer." Informants may function in other ways as well, but the methodological directive, particularly in light of the above observations regarding different positions and vantage points within any enveloping context, is that the credibility of ethnographic representation depends not only on informant accounts but also on whether we can specify the situated character of those accounts and of what they are representative. To enhance the prospect of doing this requires that we employ other methodological strategies and devices, such as team field research, which, through the use of multiple researchers, facilitates access to a greater variety of informants and angles of vision and thus more voices and data points, and that we therefore resuscitate the logic and practice of triangulation, particularly with respect to data sources, informants, and researchers. Such methodological considerations and procedures, which are neither new nor exhaustive, suggest that the presumed problem of representation can be neutralized or rendered relatively mute. If so, then the problem is not the impossibility of conducting ethnographies that yield reasonable, realist approximations of the social worlds investigated-as evidenced, for example, by the previously cited ethnographies of Adler and Adler (1998), Charmaz (1991) , Duneier (1999) , Fine (1996) , Horowitz (1996 ), Morrill (1995 , and Snow and Anderson (1993) -but the existence of a "crisis frame" that some number of ethnographers have bought into and, as a result, that they have discarded ethnographically relevant sociological and methodological principles and guidelines of the kind discussed above.
NOTES
1. It is worth noting that the goal of securing approximate rather than exact understandings of the objects of ethnographic exploration is not only consistent with the pragmatist philosophy in which much ethnography is rooted epistemologically, but it also is consonant with such principles in the physical sciences as the Gaussian curve and Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty. Based on these and related principles, Jacob Bronowski (1973, 353) has noted that one of the significant achievements "of physics in the twentieth century has been to prove that" the aim of providing an exact picture of the material world "is unattainable." However, this realization has not prevented the physical sciences from attempting to develop or attain compelling approximations of aspects of the material world, whether they are derived from empirical research or theoretical speculation and modeling.
2. See Snow and Morrill (1993) for an abbreviated discussion of differences in the historical development of anthropology and sociology.
3. As Mead (1980) emphasized rather graphically in The Philosophy of the Present, if we had every possible document and every possible monument from the period of J. Caesar, we would unquestionably have a truer picture of the man and of what occurred in his lifetime, but it would be a truth which belongs to the present, and a later present would reconstruct it from the standpoint of its own emergent nature. (p. 31)
Similarly, but more abstractly, Mead (1938) writes in The Philosophy of the Act, "That which arrives that is novel gives a continually new past. A past never was in the form in which it appears as a present. Its reality is in its interpretation of the present" (p. 616). Also see Maines, Sugrue, and Katovich (1983) and Flaherty and Fine (2001) for elaboration of Mead's perspective on temporality and its sociological relevance.
THE "CRISIS" IN REPRESENTATION: REFLECTIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
MICHAEL G. FLAHERTY
Our research methods are based on epistemological assumptions. Some scholars have tried to make these assumptions controversial by asserting that they are problematic-that there is a "crisis" in representation. We are witness, then, to something of a public relations campaign, and every campaign needs a slogan around which followers can rally.
In her ironically titled essay, "Telling the Truth after Postmodernism," Dorothy Smith (1996) marshals a devastating critique of this campaign and reaffirms an empirical epistemology for the social sciences. My response to the papers by Denzin, Manning, and Snow begins with a review of Smith's essay. From that standpoint, I then return to questions I posed in the introduction to this forum.
TO POSTMODERN HELL AND BACK (THE PART OF VIRGIL WILL BE PLAYED BY DOROTHY SMITH)
The "crisis" in representation is associated with skepticism and despair. Skeptical of empiricism, those who champion postmodernism despair of ever getting at the truth of the matter. Consequently, in the world imagined by advocates of postmodernism, research and other forms of inquiry are reduced to rhetoric and politics. Smith (1996) summarizes the epistemological hell to which their paradigm would consign us:
They reject the notion that there can be an overriding truth to which alternative views, theories, and versions of the world must be subordinated. Language or discourse, not the objects or events, determine representation. There can be, therefore, no reality posited beyond the text with reference to which meaning can be stabilized among different subjects [i.e., observers]. (pp. 174-75) We are left with the usual Modern Language Association free-for-all. If consensus emerges, it is not because the facts are stable-to use a word 508 JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY ETHNOGRAPHY / AUGUST 2002 invoked by both Smith (above) and Fish (below)-but because one group of scholars imposes its perspective on others. As Fish (1980) puts it, "the fact of agreement, rather than being a proof of the stability of objects is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community to constitute the objects upon which its members . . . can then agree" (p. 338, emphasis added). In other words, consensus can only be derived from what Fleck ([1935] 1979, 2, 25) calls a "prevailing thought style" or "thought collective."
Stripped of academic euphemisms, Fish is describing a bareknuckled politics of interpretation-a Bolshevik epistemology where one interpretation reigns, if at all, "because we sez so." In his world, ideology supplants empiricism, no single interpretation can be shown to be in accord with the facts, and, as in Sartre's (1947) version of hell, there is no exit. Smith (1996) notes that the damnation is twofold; since we cannot extricate ourselves by recourse to evidence, we are trapped in an endless cycle of advocacy and exegesis:
Where there is no possibility of inquiry or reference to the beyond-thetext, even a denotational language-game can only circle around itself. The object of inquiry cannot be pushy, cannot surprise those who think they are exploring it, cannot be a common point of reference in deciding who is right in arguments about what is. . . . [T] heorizing is substituted for, even displaces, inquiry. There is nothing against which the text can be evaluated except the text again or another text. There is no outside to go to, no beyond-the-text to check the text against. (p. 177) When Marcus and Fischer (1986) admit to "a preoccupation . . . with the form and rhetoric of anthropological writing" (p. 5), they do so because, from their perspective, ethnographic research is pointless. Hence, the tendency for advocates of postmodernism to talk or write about ethnography rather than conducting research in the world beyond their offices and libraries. If, as Smith (1996) points out, " [t] here can be no discovery," then "discourse as a field of study is an endless resource without destination or conclusion" (p. 177). In a postmodern world, sociology and anthropology collapse into flat, dreary, ingrown versions of literature. Smith (1996) rejects postmodernism in favor of an empirical epistemology for the social sciences-albeit one that is imbued with interactionist principles derived from Mead and Bakhtin. She begins with a fundamental assumption: REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 509 Scientific techniques and technologies of observation, [including] systematic note-taking, supplant but organize the same foundational sequence as Karen's cries and pointing to the cat, and they provide for and are intended to enable, that others can track and find the object thus entered into the social act of science. (p. 191) As Smith points out, discovery is an interactional process, "not a onetime-through event" (p. 191). Subsequent to the initial report, other members of the scientific community, "following the directions supplied in the publication [,] try to find again what the discoverers claim is there" (p. 191) . Such efforts at replication may lead to confirmation, as in Karen's case, but the disclosure of failure and fraud is also possible (Simarski 2001) .
TOWARD THE REAFFIRMATION OF AN EMPIRICAL EPISTEMOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
In light of Smith's critique of postmodernism, let us return to some of the questions I posed in the introduction to this forum. By addressing these questions, we can assess the responses from Denzin, Manning, and Snow.
Is there a crisis in representation?
No, there is not a "crisis" in representation. A handful of scholars have made assertions to that effect (at least some of which are thinly veiled efforts to incite a crisis), but Smith shows that their arguments are unpersuasive, and there is no evidence supporting their claims. On the contrary, all indications are that realist ethnography is flourishing. Ethnography is published in two forms: books and articles. Snow identifies seven exemplary books, and it is easy for me to match his list with seven of my own selections (Adler 1993; Anderson 1999; Eder, Evans, and Parker 1995; Henson 1996; Loseke 1992; Sanders 1989; Schwalbe 1996) . It is noteworthy that all of these studies have been published since 1989, and only a restriction on the length of our papers prevents us from adding many others. As Snow points out, books of this sort win awards, stay in print, influence the field, and contribute to an accumulating body of knowledge. Moreover, having recently ended a four-year term as editor of Symbolic Interaction (1996 Interaction ( -1999 , I can vouch for the fact that the vast majority of the REVIEW SYMPOSIUM 511 articles we published were based on realist ethnography or other forms of empirical inquiry. Outstanding examples include studies by Cahill (1999) , Copp (1998) , McCorkel (1998) , Milligan (1998) , Ortiz (1997) , Vail (1999) , Vinitzky-Seroussi and Zussman (1996) , and Vittoria (1999) . At the same time, there is growing evidence of a backlash against postmodernism. Indeed, it is increasingly the target of criticism and the butt of ridicule in the popular press as well as academic discourse (Leo 1999; Leyner 1997; Thu 1999; Wasserstrom 1998) . As Manning suggests, this may be due to the limited patience people have with indeterminacy, meaninglessness, and apocalyptic pronouncements. There is, should be, and will continue to be ferment in the practice of ethnographic research, but innovation and continued growth do not signal a "crisis," and they should not be used as a pretext for provoking one.
What are the implications of this claim for ethnographic research?
The answer, of course, depends on whether you take postmodernist claims seriously. As Denzin (1986, 194) has written elsewhere, "a critique of scientific knowledge and realism" is integral to the postmodernist agenda. When pursued ad absurdum, however, this critique leads to paralysis and futility. As an alternative to ethnographic research, Denzin calls for social criticism, and he states that "the criteria for evaluating critical qualitative work are moral and ethical." In his admittedly "utopian project," cultural critics will show "how particular texts . . . misrepresent persons," and they will serve as advocates "for the side of the underdog." But if every text is open to multiple interpretations, no one of which is true or in accord with the facts, how can a text "misrepresent" anyone? What makes the cultural critic's interpretation or representation more valid than that of anyone else, including those in positions of power? Inevitably, one's stance becomes politicized ("neoMarxist" in Denzin's perspective) once inquiry, evidence, and truth are discarded in favor of ideology and politically correct positions within thought collectives. In recent years, I have studied variations in the perceived passage of time (Flaherty 1999) . Who is the underdog in that research arena? What if there is no underdog? Would that make this line of inquiry (and many like it) worthless? Snow has written a masterful summary of how careful adherence to empirical procedures and principles enables us to overcome the manifold challenges in ethnographic research. Like Manning and Snow, I do not believe that there is any need to abandon what we have been doing.
What is the relationship between observation and interpretation in ethnographic research?
If, as Fish argues, the facts are determined by one's interpretive stance, then there is nothing the data can do to contradict one's interpretation. Thus, in his most lyrical and important passage, Blumer (1969) makes it clear that we must choose between empiricism and solipsism:
One errs if he thinks that since the empirical world can exist for human beings only in terms of images or conceptions of it, therefore reality must be sought in images or conceptions independent of an empirical world. Such a solipsistic position is untenable and would make empirical science impossible. The position is untenable because of the fact that the empirical world can "talk back" to our pictures of it or assertions about it-talk back in the sense of challenging and resisting, or not bending to, our images or conceptions of it. (p. 22) There is, then, always the possibility that one's interpretation is incorrect. It follows that the conscientious ethnographer must give the empirical world an honest chance to say, "No, you're wrong." In short, observation trumps interpretation. It is also worth noting that empiricism is not synonymous with the analysis of quantitative data. However, those of us who are integrationists, rather than separatists, are opposed to the methodological balkanization of the social sciences. Consequently, I disagree with the suggestion, implicit in Manning's essay, that quantitative and qualitative research are antithetical. Like King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) , I would assert that any differences between quantitative and qualitative research are stylistic, not epistemological.
What basis is there, if any, for the researcher's authority to represent others ethnographically?
For those who champion indeterminacy and cynicism, there can be no authority (save, ironically, their own evangelical efforts to proclaim the "end" of ethnography). But if we embrace an empirical epistemology, then credibility and authority are based on the researcher's ability to marshal evidence that corroborates a particular ethnographic representation. In keeping with Blumer's (1969, 37) perspective, the author will be charged with demonstrating that interpretations have been "tested and modified by firsthand acquaintance with the sphere of life" under examination. Evidence of intimate familiarity serves to substantiate typically implicit claims to authority and expertise. Nonetheless, ethnographic representation inevitably involves a
